In scenarios such as natural disasters and military strike, it is common for unmanned aerial 1 vehicles (UAVs) to form groups to execute reconnaissance and surveillance. To ensure the effectiveness 2 of UAV communications, repeated resource acquisition issues and transmission mechanism design 3 need to be addressed urgently. In this paper, we build an information interaction scenario in a Flying 4 Ad-hoc network (FANET). The data transmission problem with the goal of throughput maximization 5 is modeled as a coalition game framework. Then, a novel mechanism of coalition selection and 6 data transmission based on group-buying is investigated. Since large-scale UAVs will generate 7 high transmission overhead due to the overlapping resource requirements, we propose a resource 8 allocation optimization method based on distributed data content. Comparing existing works, a data 9 transmission and coalition formation mechanism is designed. Then the system model is classified 10 into graph game and coalition formation game. Through the design of the utility function, we prove 11 that both games have stable solutions. We also prove the convergence of the proposed approach 
size are the same. The data requirements for UAV n can be described as A n = (a 1 n , a 2 n · · · a l n n ), where l n 107 represents the the size of UAV n's data packet, a k n is the content of UAV n's k th data, 1 ≤ k ≤ l n .
108
In UAV-to-UAV communication, the transmission distance can significantly affect the quality of the link. In [17] , the authors analyzed the experiments in the same RF band and collected data such as distance, data packet and orientation. The experiments is carried out using the AR Drone 2.0 platform [18] . Then, a mathematical channel model is designed, from which the packet delivery ratio (PDR) of collected data can be well predicted given the distance between two nodes. The generic form of the proposed PDR channel model is given by:
where d h = − ln(2)/R k 1 represents the distance between two UAVs when the packet success rate is specific data content (says data 2). Then the coalition cluster-head UAV downloads data from the 120 central UAV through UAV-to-UAV links, and transmits data to the members of its coalition through 121 designed multi-hop routing mechanism. Suppose ε = {ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . , ε s , . . . , ε S } is the sets of all existing 122 UAV-to-UAV links for data transmission. For i, j ∈ N , let e i,j be the link status from node i to j.
123
Specially, we say the link exists considering data content s, if e i,j ∈ ε s . The value of e i,j is set to be d i,j ,
124
representing the distance between current link. 
Problem formulation

126
From the above system model, the coalition selection problem considering overlapping data 127 requirements should be addressed to reduce overall spectrum requirement overhead. Context 128 awareness is introduced to describe the relation among different UAVs' data contents. But first,
129
the relation in coalition should be well studied.
130
In order to maximize the overall data transmission throughput in different coalitions, the connected graph is considered to depict the UAV-to-UAV links. For the UAV group in coalition m considering content requirement s, the coordinates of cluster head UAV is g ch m . Then, in UAV n's current forming coalition based on data content s, the data packet transmission probability through multi-hop path from cluster head UAV to UAV n can be derived as follows:
Pb(e i,j ), otherwise.
Here, ε s,n ∈ ε s represents the set of links of from the cluster head UAV ch c n to the cluster member UAV 131 n.
132
Denote the coordinate of the central UAV as g 0 . When content s ∈ S is taken into consider, the network can form a coalition partition M = {1, 2, . . . , m, . . . , M}. The UAV subsets which belong to coalition m based on content s is described as CO s m = {n ∈ N : s ∈ A n , c n = m}. The packet transmission speed is defined as T s , then we characterize the transmission throughput of UAVs in coalition m when considering data content s as follows: The function consists of two items, the first item is the transmission probability of one data content 133 transmitted from the central UAV to the coalition m. The latter item of the equation is the successful 134 transmission probability of single data packet transmitted from cluster head UAV to cluster member
135
UAV n.
136
Therefore, the total transmission throughput of the whole network when content s is considered can be calculated as follows:
Obviously, the longer the path per hop, the lower the probability of transmission success, and similarly, the more hops, the smaller the overall throughput, so there will be no major league or single-coalition full path formation. Therefore, the transmission throughput of the whole network based on all data is:
Our object is to maximize the data throughput of the whole network by adjusting the network structure of the UAV group and coalition selection considering different contents.
From the view of each data s ∈ S, our object is to obtain an independent solution in the FANET,
137
including the optimal data transmission mechanism and resources allocation approach. In the next 
Coalitional Graph Game for Data Transmission
142
We firstly focus data transmission when the group-buying mechanism is determined. 
153
• N is a set of all nodes (including central UAV)
154
• ε is the set of all edges (UAV-to-UAV links). For any i, j ∈ N , we say the link from i to j exists, if e i,j ∈ ε.
155
• C n is the available coalition selections for each n ∈ N , let c n ∈ C n denote the coalition selection for n.
156
• U1 n represents the utility function of UAV n while playing its strategy.
157
Consider the characteristics of routing mechanism in one coalition, the strategy of each UAV 158 n ∈ N should be the UAV of n's own previous hop. Formally, denote a n as the strategy selection of
159
UAV n, where a n ∈ CO c n . Thus, learning from [19] [20], a local strategy is called a feasible local strategy 160 a n ∈ A n if and only if: (1) U1 n (G) ≥ U1 n (G ), (2) U1 a n (G) ≥ U1 a n (G ) for a n = n, a n = n. Here, G is 161 the current graph, and G is the consequent graph by UAV n's local strategy a n . In summary, the local 162 utility function is derived and given in the following. 
1) Utility function
Given an action graph G(N , ε s ), the UAV n's local utility function can be expressed as :
It can be seen that U1 n (G) = Th(ε s , c n )/B, representing the transmission probability for data packet s 165 in coalition c n and is determined by UAV n's connecting drone's selection a n , which affects ε s eventually.
166
It should be pointed out that the value of U1 n (G) and U1 a n (G) are the same, since two functions both 167 represent the current coalition c n 's transmission probability for data s.
168
Centralized approach will cause much calculation load. In that case, a distributive network 169 formation algorithm is proposed for each UAV n to carry out in our coalitional graph game, which is 170 classified as follows:
171
Algorithm 1: Maximum throughput network formation algorithm
2)while: All UAVs in coalition c n are connected considering data content s, i.e. K = CO s c n .
Offer UAV i and UAV m a new link e i,m . Add i and e i,m into K and ε n s respectively. End 3)Output routing link ε n s .
Note that the proposed algorithm actually focuses on maximizing the current utility of coalition 172 c n , thus we can obtain ε s and ε by setting up different data content and UAV. Next, the convergency of 173 the proposed network formation games is analyzed.
174
2) Convergency and stability
175
To study the properties of stability, definition of local Nash network is given in the following. Suppose the available coalitions of UAV n is denoted as C n . Formally, the game can be
, where U2 n represents UAV n's utility function
197
and is expresses as U2 n (c n ,
profiles of all the UAVs excluding n. In G b , the value of a coalition CO depends solely on the members 199 of that coalition, with no dependence on the other UAVs in Π \ CO. So G b is the characteristic form. 
206
Given the stable state of coalition graph game G a , then the network topology G(N , ε) is determined, so the local utility function of UAV n can be denoted as follows:
According to Eq.(8), the UAV n's local utility represents the data throughput of its current coalition, and 
210
In CFG, coalition partitions are denoted as a set Π = {CO m } M m=1 which partitions all the UAVs N .
211
According to the definition 3, the coalition selection of UAV i is determined by its preference relation . The preference relation of coalition partition Π satisfies pareto order if for arbitrary UAV n and coalition CO and CO ,
In Pareto order, for the UAV n completing the coalition selection, neither the profit of the UAVs 215 in its original coalition CO nor that in its new coalition CO will be damaged. This feature ensures 216 that the overall profit of the coalition partitions Π will never fall, which provides sufficient theoretical by mapping the overall utility of system model to UAV's local utilities.
Definition 5 (Coalition order). The preference relation of coalition partition Π satisfies coalition order if for arbitrary UAV n and coalition CO and CO ,
In coalition order, UAV n selects coalition by considering the total utility of both original coalition
223
CO and new coalition CO . Hence, it can bring the maximal profit for the system model, which will be 224 reflected in the subsequent proof and simulation. calculations.
236
In order to avoid those problems (local optimum, invalid calculation, etc.) caused by traditional 237 rules, we design the following mechanism for coalition selection.
238
Definition 6 (Coalition selection mechanism). For UAV n ∈ CO 1 , it will select CO 2 , when the newly formed coalition can achieve a better utility.
Under different rules, the utility function of this mechanism has different definitions. For example, A coalition partition Π is said to be stable if no player (says n) can benefit from moving from his coalition CO c n to another existing coalition CO c n with the corresponding order, i.e. if ∀i ∈ N :
then Π is thought to be a stable coalition partition.
247
In the following, stability of the final coalition partition is demonstrated based on coalition 248 selection mechanism with different orders. ). For utility function U2 n (c n , c −n ) in a game G b , if there exists a function φ : C n → R, for arbitrary UAV's (says n's) coalition strategy changes from c n to c n , the following equation is true:
then this game is called exact potential game (EPG) and has at least one Nash equilibrium (NE) point, the 263 function is called potential function.
264
The NE point guarantees the stability of the UAV strategy selection and system model utility.
265
When the potential function has physical meaning, the NE point can also determine its final 266 convergence state.
267
Theorem 2. The proposed CFG G b with coalition order has at least one stable coalition partition.
268
By constructing the potential function, we introduce the potential game as a tool to analyze the 269 performance and stability of the designed utility function [28] . In potential game, there exists at least 270 one pure Nash equilibrium. Next is the proof of the theorem 2.
271
Proof. First, from the view of any data content, says s, the stability of the internal coalition structure 272 has been proved in the above.
273
Then we construct the potential function as follows: φ n (c n , c −n ) = ∑ m∈M Th(ε s , m), which represents the overall transmission throughput of data s. It can be concluded that
Note that UAV n's one step strategy only changes the utility of its original coalition c n and new coalition c n , but has no effect on other existing coalition. So the first and the third item are equal in value. According to Eq. (8) and Eq. (14), we have the following formula:
So the current game can be proved to be an exact potential game (EPG) [29] , which has at least one 274 pure Nash equilibrium (NE) point. Since the potential function φ n (c n , c −n ) numerically refers to the overall transmission throughput of the data s, which shows that the constructed utility function can 276 work out the optimal solution of G b through local interaction.
277
According to the characteristic of NE, the coalition partition Π can be proved to be stable 278 considering different data content, for there is no any other player can promote its utility function by 279 changing its coalition selection strategy. Hence, there exists at least one stable coalition partition Π in 280 CFG G b .
281
Theorem 3. Given the designed coalition mechanism, the proposed CFG G b has a stable coalition partition of P.
282
Proof. Based on the above proof of the stable partition existence with both orders, there always exists 283 a local Nash network G a , then ε s , s ∈ S is derived. 1, the coalition partition on the system will shift continuously between finite states, which are fixed 288 stable partition solutions.
289
In the coalition order, when the exchange mechanism happens, it improves the selected UAVs' should be noted that the strategy change of a single UAV directly affects the whole system, so the 293 utility of the system can converge to the optimal state. In addition, even if a single UAV's selection 294 mechanism puts the convergence process at a disadvantage, the coalition order will put the path back 295 in the right direction, eventually forming a stable coalition partition c n , n ∈ N . It can effectively avoid 296 local optimum, but at the same time, more convergence times will be caused. The proofs of the stable 297 coalition partitions under different data s ∈ S are also similarly available. Then, we can explore the 298 network structure of the UAV coalition ε s,n and coalition selection c n ;
299
In summary, given the designed coalition mechanism, the proposed CFG G b has a stable coalition 300 partition of P.
301
Simulation results in the next section verify the existence of G a 's stable state. 
314
The core of the algorithm is the follows the coalition selection mechanism, according to theorem 3,
315
it can converge P in the solution of the problem 316
Simulation Results and Discussion
317
In the simulation we consider a planar square scenario where distributed UAVs carry out data Step 1: Initialize UAVs' state strategies {c n } n∈N considering data content s. Loop: k = 1, 2, . . . , IterationMax
Step 2: Select one UAV randomly, say i. UAVs i generate a new strategy c i ∈ C i /{c i (j)}. On this basis, update strategy with different orders, and the update probability is given as follows:
Step 3: Update c −i (j + 1) = c −i (j).
End loop:
Step 4: Loop step 1 through 3 and calculate T(ε) according to Eq.(6) R = 64m. Set transmission rate to be 800 pkts/s, so the packet transmission speed T s is 160KB/s. The 322 position of the distributed UAVs will be generated randomly. We considered the data transmission 
Different orders and contrast algorithms
339
In this subsection, we adopt a contrast algorithm, which only consider each UAV's overall data 340 packet and form coalition partitions without overlap. The algorithm without coalition formation is also 341 designed as a comparison method. In no coalition formation algorithm, there is no relay among UAVs,
342
and all data transmission is carried out through the direct links with the central UAV. In addition,
343
the ideal throughput is defined, which assume that there exists no energy loss in UAV-to-UAV links. From Fig.4b , we can find that the total data throughput of our proposed algorithm can achieve 352 a higher data throughput. In particular, the data throughput with coalition order is better than As a matter of fact, When other variables are fixed, UAV amount and data length can directly 361 affect overlap degree. Therefore, we now execute a comparative analysis of algorithm performance 362 considering overlap degree of data. It can be seen intuitively from Fig.5a shows that as the 363 overlap degree of data increases, the proposed approaches can achieve higher data throughput.
364
The performance with the coalition order is also better than that with the Pareto order (analysis is the 365 same as above). In summary, It shows the system model under coalition game framework can be well 366 solved and the effectiveness of our proposed approaches is testified.
367
In the following, we take into account the relationships between total data throughput and border 368 length, while the UAVs' data overlap degree is fixed. As shown in the Fig.5b , when the border length 369 of the scenario is small, our proposed approaches can achieve high data throughput. Especially with 370 coalition order, the performance is even close to the ideal throughput. However, as the border width UAVs is 64m, the transmission probability is only 50 %. When it comes to more than about 100 meters,
375
the quality of UAV-to-UAV links become so poor that it cannot perform the transfer task. Under the 376 premise of fixed UAV numbers, the increase of the border length in scenario makes it impossible to 377 maintain the proper distance of among UAVs, leading to the overload of our system model. In the previous subsection, we analyzed the effects of the proposed approaches on the system 380 model with two different orders. Next we compare the convergence performance of both orders. In 381 the algorithm, we set one loop, in which all UAVs is traversed one time. When the UAV strategy in the three-round loop remains unchanged, the algorithm is considered to converge. Then the average 383 convergence times is defined to characterize the convergence performance.
384
In order to make a better comparison, we also add a comparison algorithm described in the above.
385
The upper bound of the iterations is set to 1000. Owing to the similar results, we present the average 
Conclusion
399
In this paper, the resources allocation and data transmission problem in Flying Ad-hoc networks 400 (FANETs) was modeled as a joint coalition game. First, we investigated a novel mechanism of data 401 transmission to study inner coalition structure. Then, a resource allocation optimization based on 
